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Abstract 
 
The paper explores how the local government in China makes use of public-private 
partnership approach to promote the development of hi-tech industry in China with a 
case study of the operation mechanism of Venture Capital Guiding Funds (VCGF) in 
Hangzhou City, Zhejiang province, East China through the ‘strategic exchange’ 
perspective. The case study has important policy implications for the venture capital 
companies that intend to participate in the VCGFs of China. The local government in 
China usually plays a dominant role in the VCGFs due to the strategic resources it 
possesses. Under its specific institutional context, the public-private partnership 
approach needs to be interpreted differently from strategic level to operational level in 
China to improve the performance of VCGFs. 
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How Do Government Venture Capital Guiding Funds Finance High-tech 
Start-ups in China? A Preliminary Review 
 
Introduction  
China’s recent path to growth and development has proved to be distinctive and 
SMEs appear to have been a major driving force in this country’s “economic miracle” 
(Li and Matlay, 2006; OECD, 2004). There are currently more than 50 million SMEs, 
which account for 80 percent of employment, 60 percent of gross domestic product 
(GDP) and 50 percent of the national tax revenue (Ministry of Commerce of China, 
2010). Financing has been identified as one of the most crucial factors determining 
the survival and growth of SMEs (UNCTAD, 1995, 2001). If financial markets are not 
working efficiently and fail to provide enough capital for high-growth start-ups, it has 
been suggested that government should try to correct any occurring market failures 
(Lerner, 1999, 2010). Government intervention is based on the belief that small 
technology-based firms in particular, are a key source of innovation, job creation and 
productivity growth (Mason, 2009). Economists have also documented the strong 
connection between technological progress and economic growth, both across nations 
and over time (Nelson and Phelps, 1966; Romer, 1990; Solow, R., 1994; Barro and 
Sala-i-Martin, 2003).  
    The Chinese government has made conscious efforts towards promoting the 
development of SMEs by enacting regulations and program at local, regional and state 
levels. In 2003, the Chinese government introduced SME Promotion Law to provide a 
legal basis for government involvement in the promotion of SMEs. The Law focuses 
on developing organizations, programs and services to stimulate SME development 
(Atherton, 2008).  
   Government programs in supporting SMEs have been divided between those 
efforts that directly fund entrepreneurial firms and those that encourage or subsidize 
the development of outside investors. The well-known Torch Project in 1988 and 
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InnoFund in 1999 set up by the Ministry of Science and Technology to help 
technology-based SMEs develop and commercialize new technologies is an example 
of direct government fund support operating at state-level. However, the Chinese 
government realized that the size of fund and current support schemes, such as 
directly subsidizing R&D activities, facilitating financing from bank and reducing tax 
burdens were clearly not enough for this huge country with millions of qualified 
technology-based SMEs. As a result, in contrast to public venture capital, 
public-private partnerships (PPP) have emerged as a desirable vehicle for the 
government to solve some public management problems including the financing of 
high-tech start-ups. In 2007, State Venture Capital Fund (SVCF), the first venture 
capital fund in China, was established and operated by the central government aiming 
at guiding non-governmental investment into SMEs. Venture capital investment that 
combines both public and private fund to provide equity finance is widespread in 
OECD economies (INNO GRIPS, 2009). However, it is still a recent phenomenon in 
China. By the end of 2009, the local governments followed the central government 
and set up 50 local venture capital guiding funds, 19 of which operated at provincial 
level and 31 at city level (Chen, 2010).      
    There are multiple studies on the performance of venture capital guiding funds 
(VCGF) in developed countries including the United States, Canada and Australia and 
so on.  However, these analyses mostly operate at a country specific level (Lerner, 
1999 and 2009; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006). This paper focuses on the 
performance of VCGF by the local government in China with a view of broadening 
the capital access and improving the efficiency of resource allocation for financing 
high-tech start-ups. The previous research suggests that future private sector growth 
may be constrained should local government not develop mechanism to engage with 
the private sector to enable its continuous growth and development (Atherton and 
Smallbone, 2010). In addition, entrepreneurship development in transition economies 
suggested that market-oriented institutional development has proved to be the most 
challenging aspect of the process of market reform (Smallbone and Welter, 2009). The 
aim of this paper is to explore how the local government makes use of public-private 
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partnerships effectively to promote the development of hi-tech industry in China. The 
research questions pursued in this paper include how the local government in China 
leverages the private venture capital to finance high-tech start-ups through the scheme 
of VCGF? What are the challenges the local government is facing when implementing 
the VCGF scheme in China? 
The remainder of paper is organized into six sections. Section two reviews 
theoretical and empirical literature on the operation and performance of different 
VCGF models in developed countries. Section three discusses the main promotion 
schemes adopted by the Chinese government to develop high-tech SMEs. Research 
methods are presented in section four. Section five presents research findings with a 
case study of VCGF in Hangzhou City, Zhejiang Province, East China. Section six are 
conclusions and policy recommendations.  
 
Literature review 
Most banks regard high-tech start-ups as high-risk borrowers due to their inadequate 
tangible assets and fragility to market fluctuations. The high transaction costs of 
small-sum financing do not render the SME market as profitable as big corporations. 
However, as high-tech start-ups are reported to contribute disproportionately to 
innovation and economic growth (Cosh and Hughes, 2003), policy makers around the 
world have become increasingly concerned about the success of their high-tech 
sectors and the availability of venture capital (Cumming, 2007). For example, OECD 
governments are implementing a number of direct programs to mobilize venture 
capital in support of high-tech start-ups through the PPP. A PPP is “an arrangement in 
which the private sector participates in the supply of assets and services traditionally 
provided by the government” (IMF 2004, p.4). PPP as an approach employed for 
economic development is regarded as an agreed arrangement or a cooperative activity 
for supplying products or services where there is an integrated blend of both private 
and public ingredients. There is no doubt that any joint action of the private and 
public parties would be preferred only if both sides believe that more gains would be 
produced than action without such collaboration. PPP involves a series of functions 
5 
 
including formal identification, quantification and allocation among the partners of 
the risks associated with the partnership project (Ke et al., 2008).  
    Combined public and private money to provide equity financing is called the 
hybrid fund approach (INNO GRIPS, 2009). The approach of hybrid venture capital 
funds takes a number of forms. Some have proved beneficial to the economies in 
which they operate, such as Israel, Australia and the United States (Lerner, 1999 and 
2002; Gilson, 2003; Cumming, 2007),  but an evaluation of all such funds showed 
largely negative in the UK and Canada (Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006). Adopting 
international company-level data, Brander et al. (2010) examine the impact of 
government-sponsored venture capitalists (GVCs) on the success of client enterprise. 
The results indicate that high level of GVC support or greater intervention by the state 
(in which enterprises received 50% or more from GVC sources) reduces the success 
of high-tech start-ups. China, France and Germany all have relatively high level of 
GVC involvement. Exit performance is an objective way to assess the performance of 
entrepreneurial firms and the success of its VC financiers. IPOs are widely regarded 
as the best exit outcome (Gompers and Lerner, 1999). Another striking observation in 
this international study is that in China is ranked as the second among top ten 
countries in terms of the percentage of high-tech start-ups with an IPO.   
    Cumming and Johan (2009) assess the effectiveness of the Pre-seed Fund (PPP) 
towards promoting entrepreneurial finance in Australia. They conclude that the impact 
of government-sponsored VC funds (GVCF) depends not only on the design of the 
program but also on the selection of VC managers carrying out the investment. The 
main role of private venture capitalists will focus on the services that identify the 
potential high-tech start-ups with the market-oriented criteria and raise private capital 
for investment. The role of government programs in private equity market ought to 
complement and partner with instead of competing with private VC investment 
(Lerner, 1999, 2002; Cumming and MacIntosh, 2006). In addition, government 
funding has an important role to play in assisting the formation of venture capital 
markets. Funding is best led by the private sector (EVCA, 2010). In order to stimulate 
VC activities, a host of factors need to be taken into account including investment 
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objectives, time horizons and capabilities of different types of VC investors. Policy 
initiatives might not be likely to have expected outcomes if these factors are not taken 
into account (Colombo et al., 2010). 
   Despite the lack of universally accepted principles or conclusive evidence on 
effectiveness, efficiency and equity terms, PPP is politically popular and generally 
viewed positively by the business community as a method for contributing talent and 
capital, as well as assuring their input into important economic development decisions. 
In order to motivating fund managers to raise private capitals, initiatives like putting a 
cap on its investment return, sharing the initial risk of investment loss, thereby 
improving the desired return to private investors were adopted by public side. In this 
case, the public investment is the first portion to suffer from the potential loss of risk 
investment in the event of investment failure (INNO GRIPS, 2009).  
    As the PPP approach focuses on establishing long-term stable relationships 
between the public sector and the private venture capital institutions (Peters, 1998), it 
is highly important to establish a mechanism of effective strategic resources exchange 
that leads to a balance or equilibrium between risk and returns of the joint venture 
investment for both the local government and private venture capital institutions 
involved in the VCGF. Therefore, how to promote the successful strategic exchanges 
between the public sector and private venture capital institutions is crucial to the 
successful operation of VCGFs. This paper adopts the conceptual framework of 
strategic exchange to explore the operation mechanism of VCGF in transitional China. 
“Strategic exchange” originally explains the relationships between managers and 
social groups at micro level to promote long-term survival of the organization 
(Watson, 1994). We build our strategic exchange perspective by incorporating three 
key parties in our framework: the local government, private venture capital 
institutions and the high-tech start-ups. 
   Public-private partnerships represent an attempt to correct the shortcomings of 
traditional public organizations in efficiency and service delivery (Lerner, 2002). 
Although there have been a considerably wide range of theoretical studies and 
empirical applications of public-private partnerships, most of them are in the field of 
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the infrastructure programs under the regional urbanization (Lerner, 1999,2009; 
Cumming and Maclntosh, 2006; Poulton and Macartney, 2012), while few researches 
concentrate on supporting the growth of high-tech start-ups as a vehicle of 
governmental intervention with market failure. Therefore, the paper fills in the gap by 
examining how the private capital could be motivated to invest in the high-tech 
start-ups with the public support in China.  
 
The promotion policies of high-tech SMEs in China  
The central government in China has launched a series of promotion policies to 
encourage the development of high-tech SMEs since the late 1980s (Chen, 2010).  The 
Torch Program and the national innovation framework, which were established in 1988, 
aimed at facilitating the development of high-tech industry, encouraging the 
technology transfer and diffusing the research outputs (Atherton and Smallbone, 2010). 
Innovative Fund (Innofund) was established in 1999 to support the early stage 
commercialization of innovative high-tech projects with good market potential, but 
unattractive for commercial capital,. In other words, this fund targeted at “market 
failure” where government support is needed, bridging the capital market and 
incubating innovative start-ups. The SME Promotion Law was implemented in 2003. 
The previous policies of the Chinese government in support of SMEs were mainly 
through the measures such as directly subsidizing R&D activities, facilitating financing 
from the banks, and reducing tax burdens. The central government realized that they 
were inadequate to meet the financial needs of high-tech start-ups.  
 
   Traditionally, VC is often viewed as the primary source of capital for inventive 
high-tech start-up companies (Gompers and Lerner, 1999; 2001). In order to guide 
non-public fund to flow into high-tech SMEs, Ministry of Finance (MOF) and Ministry 
of Science and Technology (MOST) in China jointly issued the Interim Regulation on 
Managing the Venture Capital Guiding Fund for High-Tech SMEs (the Interim 
Regulation) in July 2007. The operation principle of SVCF is to let the market make 
decision on investment-worthy projects (Chen, 2010). Following the Interim 
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Regulation, four forms of public venture capital schemes were proposed, including 
Fund-of-funds (non-controlling shareholding); Co-investment; VC investment subsidy 
(risk subsidy) and VC comforting subsidy (investment guarantee) (Table 1). The 
Chinese approach to the public venture capital funds shows an apparent influence by 
the Israeli Yozma model, which emphasises leveraging private venture capital through 
indirect co-investment rather than direct public equity investment.  
   
 << Table 1>> 
 
    Because of the emphasis on decentralization and local experimentation with 
market reforms, the private sector development in China has been greatly influenced 
by local conditions, including the attitudes of local government towards the role of the 
market (Atherton and Smallbone, 2010). An emphasis on local decision making about 
policy formulation and implementation is also important because it is at the local level 
that policy makers can get close to the real needs of entrepreneurs and their business, 
which has a strong tradition during the reform period of local experimentation and 
adaptation of the central government policy to the needs of local economic 
development (Li and Rozelle, 2003). The local government expected to forge mutual 
and complementary partnership with some venture capitals to correct market failure. 
It means that the local government should explore the feasibility of leveraging the 
abundant capital and specialized business expertise from the private sector for 
financing high-tech start-ups. Li and Matlay (2006) identify decentralisation as the 
main source for the local empowerment. In turn, local empowerment is construed as 
the main motivating factor that promotes local entrepreneurship involving multiple 
stakeholders in China.  
Research methods 
This paper adopts a qualitative approach with a case study to get insights into the  
early stage development of VCGF in China. According to Mintzberg (1983), good 
sources of evidence in qualitative research include interviews and documentation. 
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Benbasat et al. (1987) indicate that the goal of data collection from various sources is 
to obtain a rich set of data regarding the specific research questions and to catch the 
contextual complexity.  
    The eastern provinces and municipalities of Jiangsu Province, Zhejiang Province, 
Guangdong , Province Shanghai City and Shandong Province account for almost half 
of all private enterprises in China (Atherton and Smallbone, 2010). This research 
selects Hangzhou City, Zhejiang province as the main research site. It is one of the 
most developed cities in China which has witnessed the rapid development of 
high-tech industry. In addition, VCGF in Hangzhou City was on the list of top ten 
VCGFs in China in 2012 (Hangzhou Municipal Government, 2012). 
The primary data in the paper were collected through semi-structured interviews 
in August 2010 and April 2011. Purposive sampling method was adopted in this 
research (Miles and Hubermann, 1994). We interviewed four government officials 
(referred to as Interviewee A), five CEOs of venture capital institutions ( referred to as 
Interviewee B)，two business managers of VCGF ( referred to as Interviewee C) and 
four senior managers of high-tech start-ups ( referred to as Interviewee D). Each 
interview lasted for about one hour on average The interviews covered the financing 
difficulty of high-tech start-ups, the strategic resources possessed by private venture 
capital institutions and local government officials, the approach Hangzhou municipal 
government adopted to finance high-tech start-ups. All the interviews were recorded 
and transcribed. Secondary data used in the paper included policy documents 
published by Hangzhou Municipal Government.  
Case study: The operation model of VCGF in Hangzhou City, East China 
Located at the southern wing of the Yangtze River Delta, Hangzhou City is the 
provincial capital of Zhejiang province. It has a population of 8.1 million. There are 
200 villages and towns (districts), including 31 villages, 99 towns and 70 sub-districts, 
with a total area of 16,596 square kilometres, including the urban area of 3,068 square 
kilometres. Under the jurisdiction are eight districts, three county-level cities and two 
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counties. SMEs play an important part in the regional economy. At the end of 2010, 
there were over 75,000 SMEs in the city, contributing to 50% of local tax revenue, 
75% of Gross Domestic Products (GDP) and 80% of employment. Hangzhou 
Municipal Government has financed the local SMEs with an annual fiscal budget of 
RMB 200 million since 2005 (Hangzhou Municipal Government, 2012). It has been 
delivering the public fund for supporting local high-tech start-ups, including  
subsidized credit programs, guarantees with special fiscal budget to encourage the 
local commercial banks to offer bank loans. In addition, it has established a special 
fiscal fund to finance the approved investment projects of local high-tech SMEs 
directly. However, there are still recognized gaps to meet the financing demand from 
the high-tech start-ups.  
 
 “For our company, it is quite hard to deal with financing problems. … Moreover, 
due to the limitation of non-current assets and cash flow, our company cannot 
acquire enough loans from banks. Therefore, what we can do is to rely on 
ourselves or borrow money from our relatives and friends.” (Interviewee D2) 
 
   Therefore, Hangzhou Municipal Government decided to establish VCGFs to  
leverage the private capital to finance high-tech start-ups and promote the rapid 
development of high-tech industry in 2008.  
 
“As you know, the fiscal budget of local government for supporting high-tech 
start-ups is always limited. In addition, the local government is not familiar with 
the operation of financial market, which could be illustrated more or less by the 
under-expected performance of traditional practices. Thus, the only way to handle 
the financing troubles of local high-tech start-ups is relying on the support of the 
local government to attract more private capital or venture capital to the 
high-tech industry. ” (Interviewee A4) 
 
The operation model of VCGF in Hangzhou City  
In 2008, Hangzhou Municipal Government followed the central government of China 
to set up a VCGF to finance high-tech start-ups with a total fiscal budget of RMB 100 
billion. It established Hangzhou VCGF Management Committee to oversee the 
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operation of fund (Hangzhou Municipal Government, 2012). The VCGF in Hangzhou 
City makes “Periodic Investment” by Hangzhou High-tech Venture Capital 
Management Co., Ltd to invest in VC funds as a non-controlling shareholder for 
about five years to attract talented fund managers and private venture capital 
institutions to the region and “Follow-up Investment” by Hangzhou Tai Bang Venture 
Capital Co., Ltd and Hangzhou Tong Hui Venture Capital Co., Ltd to invest in 
high-tech start-ups following other VCs (Figure 1). By the end of July 2011, twenty 
public-private venture capital funds had been established with the leading domestic 
venture capital institutions through the means of “Periodic Investment”. Their 
investment in 57 projects amounted to RMB 812 million, among which 30 were 
high-tech start-ups. All the projects by “Follow-up Investment” were high-tech 
start-ups in the field of e-commerce, software development, new energy, clean 
technology and bio-technology. Focused Photonics Inc. (FPI), which received 
“Follow-up Investment”, was listed at the GEM (Growth Enterprises Market) Board, 
Shenzhen Stock Exchange on 15 April 2011 (VC China Net, 2012). 
<< Figure 1>> 
 
The role of Hangzhou Municipal Government 
Hangzhou Municipal Government formulated the Guidelines on the Operation of 
Venture Capital Guiding Fund in Hangzhou City in 2008 and updated the policy 
document in 2010. The new document clarifies that the VCGF is a public fund 
working as a leverage to secure private capital to encourage the development of 
high-tech start-ups instead of seeking profit maximization (Hangzhou Municipal 
Government, 2012).        
   In order to improve the public services for venture capital companies and local 
high-tech start-ups, Hangzhou Scientific Bureau of Hangzhou Municipal Government 
established Hangzhou Venture Capital Investment Service Centre in 2008. The service 
centre offers a series of business services to the venture capital companies and the 
local high-tech start-ups through project briefing, financing consultancy, brokerage 
service and coaching for new ventures. About 40 financial institutions are stationed at 
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the service center and 118 investment and financial corporations have joined the 
membership of the service center. The total amount of venture capital accumulated by 
the service center exceeds RMB 10 billion. Therefore, Hangzhou Venture Capital 
Investment Service Centre has become a comprehensive investment and financing 
platform specifically for financing the high-tech start-ups (Hangzhou High-tech 
Pioneering Centre, 2012). 
   Meanwhile, due to the fact that there is still a shortage of professional financial 
talents to manage the Fund of Funds, Hangzhou Municipal Government has adopted 
reward policies to encourage equity investment and attract high-tech entrepreneurs 
and professional venture capitalists to the city.  
 
The role of private venture capital institutions 
Our interviews indicate that the venture capital market in China is immature 
compared with those in the developed countries. There is still lack of an eco-system 
for the development of venture capital industry in China. Since there are many 
investment opportunities, some private venture capital institutions think it 
unnecessary to take high risks in investing high-tech start-ups. The investment 
projects with VCGF support in Hangzhou city have been largely successful. This high 
success rate in PPP is a rare phenomenon in a mature venture capital market, for 
example, as the most possible outcome of a venture-backed investment is failure or 
modest success in the United States (Lerner, 2002). The costs involved in investment 
appraisal and monitoring are fixed regardless of the size of investment and these costs 
are likely to be highest in the case of investment in technology-based start-ups due to 
the requirement for more detailed information to understand the new technology and 
potential markets (Mason and Harrison, 2004), which further results in the reluctance 
of venture capital institutions to participate in. A typical criterion of venture capital 
institution for selecting an investment target was “high growth SME with IPO 
potential” in China. Some venture capital companies participating in the VCGF have 
focused more on the pre-IPO SMEs instead of nurturing hi-tech start-ups. Therefore, 
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the VCGF scheme in Hangzhou City exhibits the typical feature of short-termism.  
 
  “We have established RMB funds in various areas including Hangzhou City 
because Zhejiang province is famous for SME industrial clusters. If we can 
cooperate with the local government, we will be able to find out the potential 
leading SMEs in the regional industrial clusters. In the short-run, American 
venture capital model is not suitable for China because the VC market here is still 
immature.” (Interviewee B2)  
 
     The current arrangements appear to be associated with weak mechanisms for 
managing information flow. Asymmetric information can lead to market failures in the 
financing of early-stage entrepreneurial ventures-much more than in other parts of the 
financial sector (Lelarge et al., 2008), as entrepreneurs may possess more information 
about the nature and characteristics of their products and processes than potential 
financiers (OECD 1997; 2004).  
  “There is still amble room for the further development of venture capital industry in 
Hangzhou city. But we are facing two challenges. Firstly, the financial needs from 
those high-tech start-ups have not been satisfied fully because some private 
venture capital firms are unwilling to take high risks during the venture investment. 
Secondly, the information asymmetry is a common problem for most venture 
capital companies because there is huge uncertainty in high-tech start-ups 
regarding the opportunistic behavior by entrepreneurs.” (Interviewee B3)  
 
    The shortage of professional fund managers is another big challenge for most of 
venture capital corporations in Hangzhou city. 
 
  “We need to recruit more professional investment talents. They can not only find 
out potential high-tech start-ups, but also assess those potential investment 
programs. As far as the management process is concerned, it is difficult for us to 
satisfy all the expectations of high-tech start-ups, such as management 
consultation” (Interviewee B6) 
 
The strategic exchange between the local government, private venture capital 
institutions and high- tech start-ups 
The VCGF in Hangzhou City aims to improve effectiveness and efficiency of venture 
investment by introducing competition and market-oriented operating mode in 
14 
 
financing hi-tech start-ups. The private venture capital institutions specialize in 
identifying and investing in those high-tech start-ups with potential growth under the 
market-oriented principle. Whether the VCGF can succeed would be determined by 
the strategic exchange between the local government and private venture capital 
institutions to ensure a balanced allocation of risks and returns from investment.  
 
 “Financing activity is a kind of market behavior. In other words, it is the 
strategic exchange between the local government, hi-tech start-ups and venture 
capital institutions. Hence, there are three key issues, namely, the market-oriented 
operational mode, sharing the risk and returns of venture investment.” 
(Interviewee C1) 
 
    The commercial operation and independent decision-making of private venture 
capital institutions are guaranteed through the design of equity structure. Hangzhou 
Municipal Government has avoided imposing the excessive interference with the 
operation of private venture capital companies. The investment decision has been 
delegated to the professional fund managers as the interviewee indicates.  
 
   Each partner involved is expected to be well prepared for offering what the other 
partner desires, which contributes to strengthening and sustaining the partnership with 
joint efforts for shared strategic vision. For instance, the local government is 
interested in the abundant capital and business expertise from the private counterparts, 
while the input of public capital, returns of investment and shared information have 
been mentioned repeatedly by the interviewees in the private venture capital sector for 
the proposed partnerships. Both sides of partnership need to cooperate with each other, 
and share the risks of venture investment. 
 
    The local government in China possesses more strategic resources than that in 
developed countries including fiscal capital, tax incentives, listing quotas. Business 
promotion is potentially another strong attraction to private venture capital 
institutions.  
 
  “Relying on the guarantees from the government, those SMEs, whether in the 
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initial stage or in the mature stage, can be a little easier to get some loans from 
the specific bank than ever. Moreover, the Financial Services Department of 
Hangzhou Municipal Government also attempts to set a series of favorable 
policies to encourage high-tech SMEs to be listed at the stock market for 
broadening funding channels.” (Interviewee A3) 
 
    In addition, the local government in China usually links VCGF to multiple policy 
objectives. For example, the VCGF in Hangzhou City is closely related to the 
promotion of regional industrial development and industrial upgrading. There has 
been inter-city, provincial or regional competition for attracting venture capital or 
other forms of private capital. 
   Maintaining the equilibrium of strategic exchange is obviously critical in 
mechanism formation of public-private partnerships in financing high-tech start-ups. 
Hangzhou Municipal Government has adopted the following model of VCGF to 
realize the strategic changes among the local government, private venture capital 
institutions and hi-tech entrepreneurs ( Figure 2).  
<< Figure 2>> 
   In the designed model, the public-private partnerships for financing high-tech 
start-ups involve the local government, private investors and fund managers with their 
respective roles and desired goals. The government investors, including the public 
agencies on behalf of the provincial, municipal, and county district governments, 
invest a portion of public capital with information services for targeting the size or 
sector of investment in high-tech start-ups and agree to share the lower rate of return 
with shared risk in its participation. However, previous literature indicates that the 
local government usually has different objectives from the private sector venture 
capitalists (Brander et al., 2010), which are often reflected in “mandates” received by 
the VCGF from the Chinese governments. One possible mandate consideration in our 
paper is on promoting technological innovation and industrial upgrading by 
stimulating participation of private venture capital companies. This principle is 
typically reflected by the fact that the government fund to private fund ratio is even 
lower than government programs in other developed countries. However, the 
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government intervention is inevitable under the institutional context of China. 
Supervision on capital flow for the investment direction by the local government is a 
distinctive role to ensure the fulfillment of “mandate” and further to maintain a long 
stable relationship with private partner.  
   Maintaining information flow is another key aspect to ensure an effective 
establishment of PPP. Since the VCGF is established for targeting local high-tech 
start-ups, information flow from high-tech start-ups  to the public  and private 
equity holders is particularly important to ensure goal congruence among the three 
parties. Educating entrepreneurs is also critical to the process, as they may have a 
great deal of confidence, but relatively little understanding of the expectations of 
potential strategic partners (Lerner, 2010). All stakeholders should be informed of the 
business affairs associated with the plan, progress and outcomes of venture 
investment. This role can be achieved by means of a well-designed information 
disclosure system and  an internal regular reporting mechanism, thereby 
strengthening efficient communication and facilitating partnership for both sides.   
 
Conclusions and policy implications 
This paper has attempted to provide a preliminary observation and review on the 
operational mechanism and potential challenges of VCGF to finance high-tech 
start-ups in China. From the government point of view, VCGF leverages more private 
capital to the high-tech industry. The financing sources for local high-tech start-ups 
could be favorably broadened and the supply of capital available would be magnified 
in folds from the public sector with the partnership of private venture capital 
corporations. Public-private partnerships integrate the capital of both public and 
private partners for financing high-tech start-ups and serve to leverage more private 
capital to flow into the venture capital industry by the demonstrating effect in China. 
The desirable demonstration effect of partnership is through creating strategic 
exchanges between the local government and the venture capital companies. The local 
government makes use of VCGF to correct market failure by acquiring funding and 
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professional capabilities to offset their weaknesses.  
   The case study of VCGF in Hangzhou City indicates that the private venture  
capital is expected to cooperate with the government for more desirable investment 
opportunities to increase their returns and match with acceptable risks. The 
investment risk in high-tech start-ups is supposed to be shared by two parties in 
partnership, thereby keeping the potential profit and loss from investment within their 
respective accepted scopes and boosting their investment confidence. However, there 
is non-alignment on objectives within this partnership, which results in short-termism 
rather than long-term stable relationship.  
   The interviews indicate that the investment in high-tech start-ups is not always 
perceived as an attractive target to private venture capitalists since there are a large 
number of investment opportunities available in China. Therefore, promoting the 
venture capital market by stimulating private investors engagement is a crucial step to 
create the foundation of PPP from the local government perspective. However, a 
balance needs to be reached and maintained between achieving the objectives of 
investing in high-tech start-ups and attracting private capital. The financing 
constraints experienced by SMEs are conventionally attributed to the existence of 
information asymmetries (Mason, 2009). Therefore, forging an adequate service 
center as a platform by the local government largely facilitates information flow 
between the private venture capital corporations and high-tech start-ups at the 
assessment and evaluation stage. In addition, gathering the information by the local 
government on current level of entrepreneurial activity in the local market, the 
decision-making process of the investment has been mainly delegated to private 
investors. Under the specific Chinese context, the strategic resources possessed by the 
local or provincial government such as the IPO assistance are a distinctive factor to 
encourage participation in the investment in high-tech start-ups by private venture 
capital corporations.  
   The local government in China has tried to introduce the market orientation in 
financing high-tech start-ups. However, the practice that VCGF is best led by the 
private venture capital companies does not really fit into the business environment 
18 
 
and institutional context of China. The government funding is mainly driven by policy 
and serves “mandates”, because of speculative characteristics in the venture capital 
industry of China. VCGF has to be developed and structured under the supervision of 
government shareholder. However, at operational level of VCGF, both public and 
private stakeholders should follow the market-oriented principle by minimizing the 
intervention or control over business decisions of high-tech start-ups. In addition, a 
well-designed reporting mechanism is also required to monitor the performance of 
high-tech start-ups by the local government and private venture capital companies. 
    The case study has important policy implications for the venture capital 
companies that intend to participate in the VCGFs of China. The local government in 
China usually plays a dominant role in the VCGFs due to the strategic resources it 
possesses. Under its specific institutional context, the PPP approach needs to be 
interpreted differently from the strategic level to the operational level in China to 
improve the performance of VCGFs. 
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